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Introduction
Learned traits and in particular cultural traits are non-
genetically determined phenotypes that are acquired
during an individual’s lifespan. They are not only
characteristic of humans but are also expressed by many
vertebrates (Laland & Janik, 2006). For instance, chim-
panzees use sticks to catch prey and stones to crack nuts;
and macaques wash potatoes and apples, unwrap and
consume caramels, and can learn a whole spectrum of
other feeding behaviours (Lefebvre, 1995; Whiten et al.,
1999; Dugatkin, 2004). Some birds are able to learn new
songs but they can also acquire techniques to bait fish,
batter or drop different types of prey on different
substrates, use caps to carry water, use twigs to push
nuts, and pull fishing lines to get fish under water
(Lefebvre et al., 2002).
There are two basic ways by which an individual may
learn a new trait (Rogers, 1988). First, the trait can be
learned individually. Here, an individual interacts with
its environment and learns the trait by trial-and-error,
lucky accident, insight, or deduction. This can be viewed
as cultural innovation, and this process may also depend
on the number of traits already carried by the individuals
in the population. Alternatively, a trait can be learned
socially, in which case an individual obtains the trait by
imitating or copying it from another individual in the
population. This is cultural transmission. This second case
is likely to involve social interactions between individuals
in the population, and errors in transmission may further
increase the rate of innovation of cultural traits.
Cultural innovation is to cultural evolution what
mutation is to biological evolution: without innovation,
cultural traits and therefore cultural transmission would
not exist. In humans, these features may have led to the
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Abstract
When individuals in a population can acquire traits through learning, each
individual may express a certain number of distinct cultural traits. These traits
may have been either invented by the individual himself or acquired from
others in the population. Here, we develop a game theoretic model for the
accumulation of cultural traits through individual and social learning. We
explore how the rates of innovation, decay, and transmission of cultural traits
affect the evolutionary stable (ES) levels of individual and social learning and
the number of cultural traits expressed by an individual when cultural
dynamics are at a steady-state. We explore the evolution of these phenotypes
in both panmictic and structured population settings. Our results suggest that
in panmictic populations, the ES level of learning and number of traits tend to
be independent of the social transmission rate of cultural traits and is mainly
affected by the innovation and decay rates. By contrast, in structured
populations, where interactions occur between relatives, the ES level of
learning and the number of traits per individual can be increased (relative to
the panmictic case) and may then markedly depend on the transmission rate
of cultural traits. This suggests that kin selection may be one additional
solution to Rogers’s paradox of nonadaptive culture.
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relaxation of at least some of the environmental pres-
sures faced by our early ancestors. Using basic objects
found in their environment, such as wooden sticks and
rocks, hominids developed new tools for foraging or
hunting. Agricultural techniques were innovated later
and led to new ways of sheltering and storing resources,
which resulted in better control over environmental
stochasticity and other hazards. The energy saved
through increased ingenuity with which hominids put
resources to use, allowed allocation of some energy to
other physiological mechanisms such as brain develop-
ment (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995), which, in turn, may
have supported new cultural innovation. Eventually,
these innovations led to the generation of technology
that is the basis of economic growth (Kremer, 1993;
Galor & Weil, 2000; Romer, 2006).
Similarly, in other vertebrate species such as primates
and birds, innovation may be important in allowing
individuals to adapt to changing environmental condi-
tions (Sol et al., 2005). Innovation allows individuals to
adapt to new selective pressures by avoidance of new
predators (Berger et al., 2001) and by changing resource
utilization (Estes et al., 1998). Birds and mammals with a
greater tendency to innovate also show a higher pro-
pensity to successfully migrate into a new environment
(Sol et al., 2005; 2008). There is also some evidence that
the more innovative species are those that store less food
(Lefebvre & Bolhuis, 2003). This observation suggests
that a higher rate of innovation may result in a greater
number of traits acquired during an individuals’ lifespan
and less sensitivity to environmental variations. The
ability to innovate might thus have played a crucial role
not only in the evolution of hominids but also in the
evolution of other vertebrates.
What is the number of learned traits (or learned pieces
of information) carried by an individual in humans or
other species? One can speculate that the more traits an
individual has, the more likely it is to cope with a variable,
constantly changing environment. Hence, there might be
a selection pressure for increasing the number of learned
traits expressed by an individual during its lifetime. This
number is likely to be constrained by at least two sets of
factors. The first are physiological and environmental. To
support individual and social learning, individuals need
physiological mechanisms allowing them to invent,
express, and remember traits, whose number is bound
by the different number of objects (and possible combi-
nations of them) encountered in the environment.
The second set of factors affecting the number of traits
acquired by an individual during its lifespan depend on
the type of social interactions it faces. Cultural traits are
probably costlier to invent, in terms of time and energy,
than they are to transmit from one individual to another
in a population. Given the cost of producing a new trait
that might be used freely by other individuals, the
evolution of innovation and cultural transmission poses a
social dilemma, which can be interpreted as a ‘producer/
scrounger’ game (Barnard & Sibly, 1981; Giraldeau et al.,
1994). It follows that the number of cultural traits carried
by an individual depends on social interactions, the
evolution of which depends considerably on life-history
and demographic features (e.g. West et al., 2007; Lion &
van Baalen, 2007).
The accumulation of learned traits in a population
thus depends on the interaction between many variables.
But, surprisingly, the quantitative dynamics of the
accumulation process remains largely unexplored, be it
on a behavioural or evolutionary time scale. In this
paper, we carry on the evolutionary approach to cumu-
lative culture (Ghirlanda & Enquist, 2007; Enquist et al.,
2008; Strimling et al., 2009; Lehmann & Feldman, 2009;
Lehmann et al., 2010; Ghirlanda et al., 2010) and develop
a game theoretic model to better understand how many
traits an individual may learn during its lifetime as a
function of several individual and social learning param-
eters. We evaluate the candidate evolutionarily stable
level of learning, the fraction of time spent on individual
versus social learning, and the associated steady-state
number of traits expressed by an individual. We do so
for two demographic scenarios: interactions occurring
only between individuals in a panmictic population and
interactions occurring between related individuals in a
family or in a spatially structured population.
Model
Assumptions
Biological setting
We assume that haploid individuals live in a population
made up of groups of finite size N that are connected by
dispersal. The individuals may be iteroparous or semelp-
arous, but we leave the exact details of the life history
unspecified as it does not affect the argument presented
in the following paragraphs. All that matters is that
interactions between individuals can occur at a local
scale, among group members, instead of occurring at
random in the population. If dispersal is limited and
group size is finite, then these interactions are likely to
occur between relatives (Hamilton, 1971; Rousset, 2004).
We assume that the individuals in this population are
endowed with physiological mechanisms allowing them
to express and remember cultural traits. For each
individual, the time interval during two reproductive
events is assumed to be divided into a number of periods
during which it forages to gain resources and when social
interactions and cultural transmission can occur between
neighbours. During each such time period, an individual
may invent novel cultural traits (individual learning),
acquire them by copying other individuals (social learn-
ing), or forget a certain number of traits acquired
previously. In the case of social learning, we assume that
the individual can acquire traits only from its group
mates and not from individuals from other groups.
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One time period can thus be thought of as a single
period of cultural innovation and transmission. Each
such learning period will affect the number of adaptive
cultural traits carried by an individual (those traits that
positively affect the organism’s vital rates) and which
we denote by A. Assuming a large number of rounds of
cultural innovation and transmission, A may eventually
converge to an equilibrium value if the time span
between reproductive events is large. We assume that
the number of offspring produced by an individual (or its
survival) is an increasing function of the steady-state
number of adaptive cultural traits it expresses and, for
simplicity, we assume that individuals express only
adaptive cultural traits.
Two-trait model
To analyse the coevolutionary dynamics of cultural
innovation and transmission, we assume a two-locus
(two-trait) model. The first locus controls the proportion
of time l that an individual spends learning. The
complementary fraction 1 ) l of the individual’s time is
spent gathering resources, which can be converted into
survival or fecundity. Because learning is either individ-
ual (producing cultural traits) or social (scrounging
cultural traits from others), a second locus is assumed
to control the proportion of time p that an individual
that is learning spends producing novel cultural traits.
A complementary fraction 1 ) p of the time is thus
allocated to socially learning cultural traits. Our aim is
to study the evolutionary dynamics of learning, l, and
producing, p.
ESS analysis
For analytical tractability, we investigate the evolution-
ary dynamics of the two traits under the assumptions
of weak selection, additive gene action, and that only
two alleles can segregate simultaneously at each locus in
the population. These are standard assumptions, which
allow us to use evolutionary game theory coupled with
inclusive fitness theory (e.g. Taylor, 1996; Gandon, 1999;
Rousset, 2004). Owing to the assumptions of weak
selection, genetic associations do not significantly affect
the evolutionary dynamics, and we can study the
evolution of each trait by holding the other trait constant
(Roze & Rousset, 2005; 2008). Hence, we do not consider
genetic covariances between traits.
For each trait, we then focus on a mutant allele coding
for a phenotype (fraction of time spent learning or
producing) whose value deviates by a small amount from
that expressed by an individual bearing a resident (wild-
type) allele and ask whether the mutant allele will be
selected for. By successive allelic replacement, each trait
may eventually converge towards a candidate evolution-
ary stable state (ESS). Application of inclusive fitness
theory to group structured populations of constant size
without class structure (reviewed in Rousset, 2004)
shows that a candidate ESS trait value z* (where z refers
either to l or p) for a behaviour affecting fecundity
satisfies the equation
@f
@z
þ j @f
@z0
¼ 0; ð1Þ
where f ” f(z•,z0) is the fecundity of a focal individual
(number of offspring produced); ¶f ⁄ ¶z• is the change in f
stemming from the focal individual expressing a mutant
allele (with phenotype denoted z•); ¶f ⁄ ¶z0 is the change in
the fecundity of the focal individual because of all of its
patch neighbours expressing the mutant allele (with
average phenotype z0); and the partial derivatives are
evaluated at z• ¼ z0 ¼ z*, the candidate ESS value of the
trait under scrutiny. The ¶f ⁄ ¶z• term can be thought of as
the direct selective pressure on the trait z, whereas ¶f ⁄ ¶z0
as the indirect selective pressure, and it is weighted by the
coefficient j, which can be thought of as a relatedness
coefficient that has been rescaled to absorb any compet-
itive effects because of limited dispersal and localized
interactions that may decrease the selective pressure on
the trait under study (Queller, 1994).
The coefficient j is typically lower than the relatedness
coefficient between group members. It has been calcu-
lated explicitly for many different life-cycle assumptions
in patch-structured and isolation by distance models (e.g.
Aoki, 1982; Rogers, 1990; Taylor, 1992; Taylor & Irwin,
2000; Gardner & West, 2006; Lehmann et al., 2006; Lion
& Gandon, 2009; Gardner, 2010) and is expressed in
terms of the demographic parameters of the population
(e.g. migration distribution, life-history features, local
demographic conditions). Because our aim in this
paper is to focus on the cumulative cultural dynamics
occurring during an individual’s lifetime, we treat j as a
model parameter but, importantly, our treatment can be
embedded in the demographic assumptions of this
previous work and many related models. For example,
as a rough approximation, j is often of order 1/N when
migration is weak and patch size is large (Lehmann &
Rousset, 2010, Table 2).
In the next section, we present expressions for the
number of cultural traits carried by an individual as a
function of its trait values and those of its patch mates.
This allows us to evaluate f as a function of the number of
cultural traits from which we can then evaluate the
adaptive dynamics of both l and p.
Dynamics of cultural trait number
Our first goal is to derive a recurrence equation over one
time period for the number A•,t of adaptive cultural traits
carried by a focal individual. This number will be affected
by the set of phenotypes {l•, l0, p•, p0}, where l• (l0) is the
proportion of time that the focal individual (an average
patch mate) expresses learning and p• (p0) is the
proportion of that time the focal individual (an average
patch mate) expresses individual learning.
Evolution of cumulative culture 3
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Because the focal individual may lose cultural traits
from one time period to the next owing to failure of
memory or obsolescence of usage of traits, may invent
novel traits, or acquire them through social learning, we
assume that the number of traits carried by the focal
individual in period t is given by
A;t ¼ ð1  ÞA;t1 þ I;t þ S;t ð2Þ
where  (0 £  £ 1) is the rate of loss of a cultural trait (or
obsolescence rate) over one time period, I•,t is the
number of new traits the focal individual acquires during
period t by individual learning, and S•,t is the number of
such traits obtained through social learning.
The number of new traits invented during period t by
the focal individual is assumed to be given by
I;t ¼ lpl; ð3Þ
where l•p• is the fraction of time the focal individual
spends on individual learning and l is the rate of
production of new traits per unit time spent learning,
which are assumed to be independent of each other (e.g.
Strimling et al., 2009).
Independence of trait innovation may be a strong
assumption. Nonindependence of trait innovation may
occur, for instance, if the rate of innovation depends on
the number of existing traits, A•,t)1, expressed by the
focal individual. It may also occur if the innovation rate
depends on the number of traits expressed by other
individuals in the population, and errors occur in the
transmission process, or if new traits are built on a
combination of existing traits expressed by the focal and/
or other individuals. But allowing for these realistic
features would result in a much more complicated
model, so they are not taken into account here, for
simplicity.
When the focal individual acquires traits through
social learning in period t, it may acquire two classes of
traits. First, it may acquire novel traits invented by others
during period t. Second, the focal individual may acquire
traits invented by others in past time periods but which it
did not acquire previously. To take these two cases into
account, we assume that the number of traits acquired by
the focal individual through social learning in period t is
given by
S;t ¼ lð1  pÞ½bnðN  1ÞI0;t þ boð1  ÞO;t1; ð4Þ
where l•(1 ) p•) is the fraction of time the focal individ-
ual spends on social learning, bn is the probability that
this individual learns from an average neighbour a
random trait that was created by a neighbour in period
t (bn can be thought of as the contact rate between
individuals multiplied by the rate of transmission of a
random trait from the neighbour), N ) 1 is the number
of neighbours the focal individual may interact with, and
I0;t ¼ l0p0l ð5Þ
is the number of new traits invented during time period t
by an average neighbour.
The second term in brackets in eqn 4 accounts for
the traits acquired by social learning in period t but that
were invented in previous time periods. Here, bo is the
probability that the focal individual learns a random trait
invented previously that it has not yet acquired, O•,t)1 is
the total number of different traits existing in the
population at time t ) 1 that the focal individual has
not yet acquired (older traits), and (1 ) ) is the decay
rate of the stock of adaptive traits not yet adopted by the
focal individual. The number of cultural traits not yet
acquired satisfies the recursion
O;t¼½1lð1pÞbnðN1ÞI0;tþ½1lð1pÞboð1ÞO;t1
ð6Þ
because at time t, the focal individual fails to acquire a
number [1 ) l•(1 ) p•)bn](N ) 1)I0,t of novel cultural
traits produced by neighbours, where (N ) 1)I0,t is the
total number of new traits produced by neighbours at
t, and the focal individual also fails to acquire a number
[1 ) l•(1 ) p•)bo](1 ) )O•,t)1 of traits it had not acquired
previously.
The total number of distinct traits segregating in the
focal group in period t is given by Tt ¼ A•,t + O•,t. Because
l[l•p• + (N ) 1)l0p0] is the total number of traits inno-
vated in the focal group per time period, Tt satisfies the
recursion
Ttþ1 ¼ ð1  ÞTt þ l½lp þ ðN  1Þl0p0; ð7Þ
which, for consistency, can be checked to hold by
substituting eqns 2 and 6 in the left member.
Equilibrium trait number and effect on fecundity
If the number of learning periods occurring during an
individual’s lifespan is large, the numbers A•,t and O•,t
may converge within that lifetime to their steady-state
values, which we denote by A• and O•, respectively.
We assume that the number of offspring produced by
an individual is an increasing linear function of the
resources it obtains. The number of resources, in turn, is
assumed to increase with the steady-state number of
cultural traits an individual carries and to decrease with
the fraction of time it spends learning. Hence, there are
two factors allowing an individual to obtain resources:
‘labor’, 1 ) l, which is the time spent gathering resources
and ‘technology’, 1 + A, which is a baseline innate ability
of an individual to extract resources augmented by the
number of cultural traits it carries. It is a standard
assumption of economics that the output per individual
depends on ‘labor’ and ‘technology’, that is, on cultural
traits (e.g. Galor & Weil, 2000; Romer, 2006), and it is
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reasonable to postulate that this assumption applies not
only to humans but also to other species. For simplicity,
we also assume that these two factors of production
combine multiplicatively to give the total amount of
resources (1 + A)(1 ) l) available to an individual.
With these assumptions, the steady-state fertility of the
focal individual is given by
f ¼ ð1 þ AÞð1  lÞ; ð8Þ
where l• is its time spent learning and A• its steady-state
number of cultural traits, which is a function of the
phenotypes of interacting individuals (p•, p0, l•, l0) and
of the model’s parameter values (, l, bo, and bn, see
eqns 26 and 27). Using eqns 8 and 26 in eqn 1, we can
now study the adaptive dynamics of l and p. Before doing
so and to gain intuition about the values that the number
of traits carried by an individual can take, we examine a
monomorphic population.
Results
Trait number in a monomorphic population
From eqn 26, the number of traits carried by a focal
individual in a monomorphic population (l• ¼ l0 ¼ l,
p• ¼ p0 ¼ p) is given by
A ¼ lðplþ ð1  pÞ½ns þ boð1  ÞOÞ

; ð9Þ
where ns ¼ bn(N ) 1)lpl. Equation 9 is the ratio of the
total number of new traits acquired per unit time by an
individual to the number of traits lost per unit time. The
number of new traits depends on the number of traits, l,
acquired per unit time of individual learning and the
number of traits acquired per unit time by social learning,
which depends on those traits generated in the present
time period by others (ns) and those generated in past
time periods and not yet copied (bo(1 ) )O). The steady-
state number of traits generated in past time periods and
not yet acquired is given by
O ¼ ½1  lð1  pÞbnðN  1Þlpl
1  ½1  lð1  pÞboð1  Þ
; ð10Þ
which when combined with eqn 9 allows us to evaluate
the total number of different traits in the population as
T ¼ Aþ O ¼ lpNl

; ð11Þ
which is an increasing function of the population-wide
number of traits lpNl invented per unit time.
The main qualitative features of eqns 9–11 are that A
tends to increase with the intensity of learning, l, but
depending on the values of the transmission rates (bn and
bo) and of , it can be a dome-shaped function of the
proportion p of time spent producing traits. The number
of different traits not yet acquired by an individual, O,
tends to increase with p but can be a dome-shaped curve
of the proportion l of time spent learning under a certain
range of parameter values. However, the total number of
different traits in the population, T, is increasing in both l
and p. Finally, we note that from eqns 9 to 11, we can
evaluate the probability that two randomly sampled traits
from two distinct individuals from the same group are
identical as
H¼AO=ðN1Þ
A
¼ Nlð1pÞ½bnþboð1Þ
þlð1pÞðN½bnþboð1ÞbnÞ
;
ð12Þ
which is the number of distinct traits shared by two
randomly sampled individuals divided by the total
number of traits carried by a single individual. The
similarity index Q is an increasing function of the cultural
transmission rates.
In the next sections, we investigate the evolutionary
dynamics of l and p, which then allows us to evaluate the
evolutionary stable (ES) trait number expressed at steady
state. The evolutionary dynamics of the full model (with
all parameters taking positive values) is complicated, and
the ES levels of learning and producing cannot always be
evaluated analytically. We studied the evolution of l and
p using analytical expressions when we were able to
derive them (or when they were not too complicated)
and used numerical analysis for the more complicated
cases.
Panmictic population
ES level of learning: baseline case
We first assume in this section that there are no effects of
relatives on the two evolving traits (j ¼ 0 in eqn 1) and
that individuals only acquire through social learning
traits that were generated in the current time period and
not those that were invented in past time periods (bn > 0
and bo ¼ 0).
Inserting eqns 8 and 26 into eqn 1, letting j ¼ 0 and
bo ¼ 0, taking learning as the focal trait (z ¼ l), and
holding producing constant (p• ¼ p0 ¼ p), we find that
the selective pressure on learning is given by
@f
@l
¼ @A
@l
ð1  lÞ  1 þ Að Þ
¼ fplþ ð1  pÞnsgð1  lÞ

 1 þ lfplþ ð1  pÞnsg

 
;
ð13Þ
which reflects a trade-off between the increase in
resources owing to the additional trait number accruing
to the focal individual (first term of eqn 13) and the loss
of resources from spending time learning instead of
gathering resources (second term of eqn 13).
Evolution of cumulative culture 5
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At an evolutionary equilibrium, gains and losses
balance each other out (i.e. ¶f ⁄ ¶l• ¼ 0), and from
eqn 13, the candidate ES level of learning is
l ¼ 1
2

1  fplþ ð1  pÞnsg

; ð14Þ
which has a maximum value of one half (when l
becomes infinitely large) and is a decreasing function of
the decay rate  and of the number ns of traits acquired
socially.
ES level of producing: baseline case
Inserting eqns 8 and 26 into eqn 1, letting j ¼ 0 and
bo ¼ 0, but with producing as the focal trait in eqn 1
(z ¼ p) and holding learning at its monomorphic value
(l• ¼ l0 ¼ l), we find that the selective pressure on
producing is
@f
@p
¼ @A
@p
ð1  lÞ
¼ lðl nsÞð1  lÞ

;
ð15Þ
where the term in the second parentheses is the number
of traits that accrue to the focal individual when it spends
one additional time unit producing instead of scrounging,
in which case it gains l additional traits and loses ns traits.
At an evolutionary equilibrium, gains and losses
balances each other out, that is ¶f ⁄ ¶p• ¼ 0, which, from
eqn 15, gives l ¼ ns. Using ns ¼ bn(N ) 1)lpl, the can-
didate ES level of producing is then given by
p ¼ 1
lbnðN  1Þ
: ð16Þ
Hence, the proportion of time spent producing is equal to
the number of traits acquired per unit time by producing
relative to the number acquired per unit time by social
learning. This is qualitatively similar to the polymorphic
equilibrium of producing found in a two-allele model
with similar baseline structure but with pure strategies
and intergenerational effects of cultural transmission
(Lehmann & Feldman, 2009, eqn 3.4).
Joint ESS
Equation 14 is a function of p, and eqn 16 is a function
of l. Setting the trait values in both equations at their
ES values and solving for l* and p*, we find that the
candidate optimal levels of learning and producing are
l ¼ l 
2l
; ð17Þ
which is increasing in l and
p ¼ 2lðl ÞbnðN  1Þ
; ð18Þ
which is decreasing in l.
With these two candidate ESS levels, we can now
determine the associated candidate optimal number of
cultural traits. By inserting eqn 18 into eqn 9, we find
that
A ¼ l

l ð19Þ
and substituting from eqn 17, we finally have
A ¼ l 
2
: ð20Þ
The candidate optimal number of traits A* is indepen-
dent of the transmission rate bn (see Fig. 1). Hence, social
learning does not affect the number of adaptive traits
expressed by an individual at steady state and, therefore,
does not increase the average fitness of individuals in the
population. This is a qualitative result that has been
observed in several earlier models for the evolution of
social learning (Rogers, 1988; Boyd & Richerson, 1995;
Wakano et al., 2004; Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007;
Lehmann & Feldman, 2009) and has been called Rogers’s
paradox of nonadaptive culture (Enquist et al., 2007;
Rendell et al., 2010).
The steady-state number of cultural traits A* is not
affected by social learning, that is, by bn, because social
learning results in the aggregation of traits from several
different individuals in the population. Although an
increase in the transmission rate bn decreases the
selective pressure on producing and thus on the time
spent innovating (eqn 18), this loss is compensated by an
increase in trait number acquired through social learn-
ing. At an evolutionary equilibrium, the same amount of
cultural traits can then be maintained with fewer
individuals producing it (Lehmann & Feldman, 2009),
and social learning is selected against at the point where
it results in a decrease in trait number relative to that
when only individual learning occurs. Nevertheless, it is
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Fig. 1 Candidate ES expected number of traits A*, eqn 20,
carried by an individual at an evolutionary equilibrium as
functions of the innovation rate l. From the top to the bottom
curve:  ¼ 0.05,0.1,0.2, and 0.4. Individuals cannot acquire traits
from past time periods (bo ¼ 0).
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important to note that the result that bn does not affect A
*
is not general and is likely to depend on the functional
relationship between trait values and cultural dynamics
as will be illustrated in the next section.
Effect of acquiring traits generated in past time periods
If we assume that individuals can acquire traits from past
learning periods that they have not yet acquired (bo > 0),
the model becomes more complicated and we have
analysed it numerically (the selective pressure on learn-
ing and producing is given by eqns 28 and 30, respec-
tively). In the top panel of Fig. 2, the ES levels of learning
and producing are graphed as functions of bo. The main
effect of increasing this parameter is that the level of
producing decreases, while l tends to decrease or remains
approximatively constant. This follows from the fact
that when individuals can also acquire traits generated
in past time periods, the number of traits they can
acquire per unit time increases, which increases the
selective pressure in favour of scrounging and decreases
the equilibrium level of producing. At the same time, the
selective pressure on learning decreases because the
increase in the number of traits acquired socially makes
the benefit of learning balance the cost at lower levels of
learning.
If we assume that bo ¼ bn ¼ b, which seems to be a
natural assumption because then individuals do not
discriminate between traits generated in present and past
learning periods, and that the parameter b is small
(i.e. taking into account only first-order effects in b near
b ¼ 0), we find that the candidate ES level of producing
is given by
p ¼ 
lbðN  1Þ ; ð21Þ
(eqns 28–31). When  ¼ 1, traits from past time periods
are no longer adaptive and eqn 21 then agrees with
eqn 16; otherwise, the proportion of time spend produc-
ing is lower than that in eqn 16 because the selective
pressure for scrounging is stronger. Under the assump-
tion that b is small, the candidate ES level of learning
takes the same value as that found previously (eqn 17),
namely l* ¼ (l ) ) ⁄ (2l) (see eqns 28–31). Substituting
this equation and eqn 21 into eqn 32, yields the candi-
date ES number of traits as A* ¼ (l ) ) ⁄ (2), which is
equivalent to that found previously (eqn 20).
The aforementioned analytic approximations for p* and
l* rely on assuming that b is small. This can be justified by
noting that this parameter involves the product of the
contact rate between individuals and the transmission
probability of a trait. If the contact rate between individ-
uals is approximatively equal to the inverse of population
size, namely, each individual interacts with each other
according to its frequency in the population, then b will
be small unless population size is very small. This seems
to be a natural assumption, and it suggests that l* might
be well approximated by eqn 17 in large populations,
whether or not individuals can acquire traits from past
generations.
When the proportion of time spent learning remains
approximatively the same, regardless of the magnitude of
b, we expect that the equilibrium number of traits A*
carried by an individual will also not vary with b. This is
indeed the case and for small b, A* is given by eqn 20,
whether or not individuals can acquire traits from past
learning periods (see Fig. 2 and eqn 32). For large values
of b, A* may increase as a function of b (Fig. 3). Here,
social learning increases the average fitness of individuals
in the population. This may be explained by noting that
even if bn ¼ 1 and bo ¼ 0, there are some traits produced
in a given time period that cannot be acquired by social
learning because of the trade-off between producing and
0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
l* , 
p*
0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
βo
β o
A*
l*
p*
µ = 0.2
µ = 0.1
µ = 0.2
µ = 0.1
µ = 0.2
µ = 0.1
Fig. 2 Upper panel: candidate ES level of learning, l*, and producing,
p*, as functions of bo with parameters values N ¼ 1000,  ¼ 0.1,
bn ¼ 0.01, and two values of the mutation rate (the upper
decreasing curve is for l ¼ 0.2, whereas the lower is for l ¼ 0.1).
When bo ¼ 0, the values of learning and producing are those given
by eqns 17 and 18. But when the value of bo increases and
approaches that of bn, the level of producing decreases. By contrast,
as bo varies, l
* remains approximatively constant (the upper flat
curve is for l ¼ 0.2, whereas the lower is for l ¼ 0.1). Lower panel:
expected number of traits A* carried by an individual at an
evolutionary equilibrium as a function of bo for the same parameter
values as those in the first panel of the figure (the upper curve is
for l ¼ 0.2 and the lower is for l ¼ 0.1).
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scrounging (at an ESS an individual spends at least some
fraction of its time producing, otherwise there would be
no cultural traits). Allowing an individual to acquire
traits generated in past time periods by social learning in
that case (bo > 0) and holding the level of producing
constant, an individual can then acquire more adaptive
traits. But this effect, where social learning now tends to
increase the mean fitness of individuals in the population
because it allows to acquire traits that would otherwise
not be possible to acquire, is not strong (lower panel of
Fig. 3), but it illustrates that whether social learners
affect A* may depend on the functional relationship
between trait values expressed by individuals and
cultural dynamics.
In summary, if each individual has a small probability
of interacting with each other individual in the popula-
tion, the ES trait number expressed by an individual is
independent of the transmission rate b so that social
learning does not increase the average fitness of individ-
uals in the population and affects only the frequency of
producers (eqn 21). This result is only weakly affected by
allowing for large b values but we will see that it is
strongly affected by allowing cultural transmission
among relatives.
Population structure: effect of relatives
We now investigate the effect of introducing interactions
between relatives on the coevolutionary dynamics of
producing and learning. This may be important in groups
of small size under limited dispersal (e.g. spatially
structured populations) or when family members inter-
act. These two cases are taken into account by letting the
parameter j be positive, so that we have also to take into
account the effect of neighbours on the fitness of a focal
individual when computing the selection gradients on
producing and learning (see eqn 1). That is, we need to
evaluate not only the direct selective pressure (¶f ⁄ ¶z•) on
a focal trait z (either l or p) but also the indirect selective
pressure (¶f ⁄ ¶z0). We evaluated the direct selective
pressure on learning and producing in the last section
(e.g. eqns 13 and 15); it now remains to evaluate the
indirect selective pressure on these two traits. To that
end, we first assume that individuals only acquire traits
through social learning that were generated in the
current period (bn > 0 and bo ¼ 0).
Joint ES level of learning and producing
The change in the fecundity of the focal individual
because of its patch mates spending one additional unit of
time learning instead of producing resources (indirect
selective pressure on learning) is obtained by inserting
eqns 8 and 26 into ¶f ⁄ l0 and holding producing constant
(p• ¼ p0 ¼ p), whereby
@f
@l0
¼ ð1  lÞð1  pÞns

: ð22Þ
This selective pressure is positive for all parameter values
so that the net selective pressure on learning, which is
obtained from ¶f ⁄ ¶l• + j¶f ⁄ ¶l0 by combining eqns 13 and
22, increases as a result of interactions taking place
between relatives.
The change in the fecundity of the focal individual
because of its patch mates spending one additional unit of
time producing instead of scrounging (indirect selective
pressure on producing) is obtained by inserting eqns 8
and 26 into ¶f ⁄ ¶p0 and holding learning at its monomor-
phic values (l• ¼ l0 ¼ l) to give
@f
@p0
¼ ð1  lÞlð1  pÞns
p
: ð23Þ
This term is also always positive because by investing
more into producing, the patch mates of the focal
individual increase the number of traits it receives
through social learning. Hence, the net selective pressure
on producing, which is obtained from ¶f ⁄ ¶p• + j¶f ⁄ ¶p0
with eqns 15 and 23, will increase as a result of the
positive indirect effect.
Solving ¶f ⁄ ¶l• + j¶f ⁄ ¶l0 ¼ 0 (with eqns 13 and 22) and
¶f ⁄ ¶p• + j¶f ⁄ ¶p0 ¼ 0 (with eqns 15 and 23) for l and p
gives the candidate ES value of producing as
p ¼ 1
1 þ j jþ
1
lbnðN  1Þ
 
; ð24Þ
where l* is a somewhat complicated functions of the
parameters (bn, l, , N, and j; see eqn 34). By comparing
eqn 24 with eqn 16, we see that the level of producing
increases with j, approximatively by the constant factor
j when this parameter is small, and it was observed
numerically that l* tends to be an increasing function of
j for the whole range of parameter values we investi-
gated. Hence, individuals spend more time learning and
µ = 0.2
µ = 0.1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
A*
β
Fig. 3 Expected number of traits A* carried by an individual at an
evolutionary equilibrium as functions of b ¼ bo ¼ bn with param-
eters values N ¼ 1000, and  ¼ 0.1, and two values of the mutation
rate (the upper curve is for l ¼ 0.2, and the lower is for l ¼ 0.1).
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producing novel traits when interactions occur between
relatives.
ES trait number
The previous analyses show that both the ES levels of
learning (eqn 34) and producing (eqn 24) will be greater
in the presence of interactions taking place between
relatives (j > 0), which suggests that the associated
stable number A* of cultural traits carried by an individ-
ual may also increase. This is indeed the case and on
substitution of eqn 24 into eqn 9 (and setting bo ¼ 0),
we have
A ¼ l

l þ j ðl
bnðN  1Þ  1Þ2
bnðN  1Þð1 þ jÞ2
" #
; ð25Þ
which is graphed in Fig. 4 as a function of j. The lower
panel of Fig. 4 also suggests that A* now varies more
strongly as a function of the transmission rate bn than
was the case when there were no interactions between
relatives (Fig. 2).
In Fig. 5, we graph A* as a function of the transmission
rate when bo ¼ bn ¼ b (no distinction between traits
generated in present and past time periods), and the
figure shows that A* increases greatly with b as j itself
increases. Here, j and b interact to determine the
number of cultural traits carried by an individual. In
contrast to the panmictic population case, where the
equilibrium number of traits carried by an individual at
steady state was approximately independent of b, this
number may be strongly affected by b when interactions
occur between relatives (Fig. 5), so that social learning
may markedly increase the average fitness of individuals
in the population.
Discussion
Justification of the model
Cultural transmission, the exchange between individuals
of nongenetically determined behaviours, would not be
possible if individuals did not imitate or communicate,
and it would not exist if individuals did not invent new
traits. In this paper, we analysed a stylized model for the
coevolution of cultural innovation and transmission in a
situation where these features determine the accumula-
tion of learned traits during an individual’s lifespan and
where the total number of accumulated traits affects an
individual’s fitness.
The structure of our model is slightly different from
classical models of cultural evolution. Instead of postu-
lating the existence of a given cultural trait and focus on
the dynamics of different variants of this trait (e.g.
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Boyd & Richerson,
1985), we assumed that each trait is either present or
absent and evaluated the dynamics of the number of
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0
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µ = 0.4
µ = 0.2
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κ
κ
Fig. 4 Expected number A* of traits carried by an individual at
an evolutionary equilibrium as a function of the relatedness
coefficient j when individuals cannot acquire traits from past
time periods (bo ¼ 0). Upper panel: from the top to the
bottom curve l ¼ 0.4,0.2, and 0.1; the other parameter values are
N ¼ 1000,  ¼ 0.05, and bn ¼ 0.01. Lower panel: from the top to
the bottom curve bn ¼ 0.01,0.02, and 0.04; the other parameter
values are N ¼ 1000,  ¼ 0.05, l ¼ 0.1.
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Fig. 5 Expected number A* of traits carried by an individual at an
evolutionary equilibrium as a function of b ¼ bo ¼ bn for various
values of j. From the top to the bottom curve j ¼ 0.01,0.005,0.001,
and 0; the other parameter values are N ¼ 1000,  ¼ 0.05, and
l ¼ 0.1.
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different traits present. By contrast to genetically deter-
mined traits, the number of different cultural traits
carried by an individual may change even during its
lifespan, especially in hominids. It is thus interesting to
try to understand how many novel cultural traits an
individual acquires during its lifespan, how does the
accumulation process operate, and what is the selection
pressure on it.
Although we did not consider this here, there is
nothing that prevents from each trait having different
variants, so that complexity may also accumulate at each
trait, as in standard models of cultural evolution. Accu-
mulation of distinct traits and gradual evolution within
traits are not mutually exclusive processes. On the
contrary, models of cultural evolution should probably
include these two processes simultaneously to be more
realistic, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Here, our aim was to investigate the accumulation side
of cultural evolution with and without interactions
occurring between relatives. To do this, we analysed
the coevolution between the proportion of time, l, that
an individual spends learning instead of producing
resources, and the proportion of learning time, p, spent
producing novel cultural traits instead of socially learning
them. These two traits determine the number of cultural
traits, A, expressed by an individual at the steady state of
the learning dynamics, which determines fitness.
We wish to emphasize that the separation of individual
learning, p, vs. social learning, 1 ) p, is a limiting assump-
tion, which may be problematic for situations where social
interactions between individuals do not result in true
cultural inheritance but rather facilitate the process of
individual learning. This may the case in many vertebrates.
Hence, our model assumes that social learning results in
inheritance of cultural traits.
Coevolution of learning and producing
Learning and producing with unrelated individuals
Under our assumptions about the functional relationship
between fitness and steady-state number of cultural traits
(eqn 8) and in the absence of interactions between
relatives (j ¼ 0), evolution leads to a proportion of time
spent learning and a trait number per individual that are
both increasing functions of the innovation rate, l, and
decreasing functions of the obsolescence rate,  (eqns 17,
20, and Fig. 1). Because the time spent producing is
inversely related to the time spent learning, the candi-
date ES level of producing decreases with l and increases
with  (eqn 18).
These results also apply when in each learning period
an individual can acquire traits that it has not acquired
previously, provided the transmission rate, b, of cultural
traits is low (Fig. 2). A low b value can generally be
justified if the population is large, in which case the
contact rate between individuals is likely to be low as it is
inversely related to population size. This suggests that at
an evolutionary equilibrium, the number of cultural
traits carried by an individual in a panmictic population
of large size is likely to depend only weakly on the social
learning rate b.
Learning and producing with relatives
Adding interactions between relatives increases both
the proportions of time spent learning and producing
(eqns 22 and 23). This can be understood as follows.
When a focal individual increases its net investment into
producing, a related neighbour that is scrounging gains
additional cultural traits that increase its fitness, thereby
increasing the inclusive fitness of the focal individual.
The indirect selective pressure on learning and producing
thus depends on having social learners in the population
(factor 1 ) p in both eqns 22 and 23), that is, it depends
strongly on b, without which the selective pressure on
learning and producing would not be increased.
Increase in learning and producing leads to an increase
in the number of learned traits carried by an individual at
steady state (eqn 34, Fig. 4). In contrast to the panmictic
case, the effect of the transmission rate b on the number
of cultural traits expressed at steady state by an individ-
ual is now important (Fig. 5). There is thus an interaction
between the social learning rate b and the relatedness
coefficient j, which suggests that kin selection may,
among other factors (e.g. Enquist et al., 2007; Lehmann
& Feldman, 2009; Rendell et al., 2010), mediate Rogers’s
paradox of nonadaptive culture.
Variations in parameter values
Individual variation in innovation and obsolescence rates
We assumed that the innovation rate of cultural traits, l,
is exogenously determined, but this parameter may
actually depend on several endogenous factors. For
instance, observations in birds suggest that behaviour
plays a central role in innovation as some individuals are
more attracted by novel objects in their environment
(neophilic individuals, for a description of this behaviour
in birds see Reader, 2003). These individuals are then
more likely to associate objects with each other and then
have a higher innovation rate than others.
It has been suggested that responses to novel objects
and propensities to innovate are heritable (Reader,
2003). If there are genetic variations in the phenotypes
underlying l, then this parameter may itself be under
selection. It has also been shown that the allocation of
energy into innovation and learning vs. its allocation into
other life-history components might change during an
individual’s lifespan and differ between the sexes (Laland
& Reader, 1999a,b), which suggests that models could be
constructed that take into account class-specific (sex, age,
stage) innovation rates that may result in cultural
structure among age or stages classes.
Individuals may not only vary in their ability to
innovate but also in the rate of loss of cultural trait, ,
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which can be interpreted as forgetfulness. For instance, it
has been demonstrated that individual’s memories
evolve across the lifespan. Memory is also known to
decrease with age in humans, but poor memory is also
found at very young ages (Neisser, 2004) and may be
adaptive (Dunlap et al., 2009). Because the mechanisms
that affect memory across the lifespan are not well
understood, we kept this parameter constant in our
model but it could also evolve with an age-specific
expression schedule, and one could include density-
dependent effects on memory, which were neglected in
this present study.
Environmental variation in innovation and obsolescence
rates
The innovation rate of cultural traits may also depend on
the complexity of the environment, that is, the number
of objects encountered by an individual in its environ-
ment. The more objects there are in the environment,
the more combinations are possible between these
objects, and the higher may be the rate of innovation,
if everything else remains the same.
Changes in the environment can also force individuals
to innovate and therefore increase l, when the existing
traits are not well adapted to a new environment.
For instance, new conditions might diminish trophic
resources; in guppies, it has been shown that the more
food-deprived fish show the highest level of innovation
(Laland & Reader, 1999a). Environmental variation may
also affect the rate of obsolescence  of the traits, because
traits might become maladaptive in a new environment
(Rogers, 1988; Galef, 2009). The more rapidly the
environment changes, the higher  is likely to be. For
instance, one can interpret the value  ¼ 1 as a situation
when the environment completely changes from one
learning period to the next.
Group size (or ‘social environment’) may also influ-
ence the rate of innovation. For instance, when individ-
uals live in groups, cooperation between them may
facilitate the ability to solve complicated tasks (Seed et al.,
2008). Also in large groups, the probability of solving a
new problem is increased because the number of
attempts to solve it is increased. Furthermore, in large
groups, variation in individual neophobia, but also in
personal experiences, increases the chance of finding
solutions in face of environmental changes (Liker &
Bokony, 2009).
Transmission rate
The transmission rate parameters (bn and bo, or simply b
if they are equal) describe the ease with which cultural
traits are transmitted from one individual to the other in
the population. The parameter b tunes the extent to
which it may be profitable to rely on social information
instead of private information (e.g. Danchin et al., 2004).
It can be thought of as the contact rate between
individuals times the rate of transmission of a random
trait expressed by another individual in the population.
The higher the transmission rate, the greater the benefits
of scrounging. On the other hand, if individual learning
is too costly in terms of time and energy, individuals may
perform more social learning (Webster & Laland, 2008),
holding b constant. In addition, the transmission rate can
also be interpreted as capturing the quality of social
information and thus can be taken to be low for less
adaptive traits copied from others. It has also been shown
empirically that social learning may be maladaptive
(Laland & Williams, 1998; Galef, 2009), but maladapta-
tions are not directly captured by our model and this
deserves further formalization.
The transmission rate b may also capture two different
types of transmission processes. The first is the process by
which the focal individual simply imitates an exemplar
individual, in which case the latter individual plays only
a passive role. This may be the case when a new
behaviour created by a producer is easily accessible to a
social learner (scrounger), who may then imitate the trait
that the producer has inadvertently expressed (uninten-
tional communication, Danchin et al., 2004). Second, b,
may involve active communication between the focal
individual and the individual it interacts with, that is,
an iterative process of message exchange, which may
end up with the focal individual learning a novel trait. If
behaviours are complicated, they might only be acquired
by communication, which may also involve teaching,
a process that has been demonstrated to occur in
several species (Hoppitt et al., 2008; Thornton & Raihani,
2008).
Because communicating is probably costlier (at least in
time for the producer) than imitating, the evolution of
the ability to communicate (including teaching) cultural
traits poses a social dilemma as well (Thornton &
Raihani, 2008). We investigated a direct extension of
our model where we let communication evolve, but
besides adding complexity it did not produce additional
qualitative results: the ES levels of learning and produc-
ing in the absence of interactions between relatives are
weakly affected by b, whereas in the presence of
interactions between relatives, communication increases
the value of b relative to imitation or copying.
Intergenerational versus intragenerational effects
We analysed our model only in the presence of intragen-
erational effects (only horizontal transmission). But
cultural traits can also be passed on from parents to
offspring (vertical transmission). If the number of periods
of cultural transmission is small, then such intergenera-
tional effects will affect the number of traits A carried by
an individual as it will determine the initial conditions
of the system of equations (eqns 2 and 6) describing
cumulative cultural dynamics. Our model can be extended
to take both inter- and intragenerational effects into
account. We carried out an analysis with intergenerational
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effects when evolution occurs in a panmictic population
and found that such effects do not affect the main
qualitative results reported here. However, taking into
account intergenerational effects in a subdivided popula-
tion is more involved and deserves further formalization.
It would also be interesting in this situation to include
the possibility that individuals copy traits from individuals
in other groups.
A case where intergenerational transmission of cul-
tural traits might have some important consequences is
when maternal care is important (Estes et al., 1998). This
strong social link may increase the rate of transmission
between individuals from different generations, which
may also occur in the case of grand mothering. The
grandmother hypothesis usually invokes the importance
of grandmothers taking care of grandchildren, when
mothers are not able to look after them (O’connell et al.,
1999). However, we might also hypothesize the impor-
tance of their role in the transmission of adaptive
cultural traits and even the transmission of obsolete
traits. Thus, given the relatively large amount of time
between the innovation of a trait and its use in
subsequent generations, there is an increase in the
probability that an environmental change occurs and,
therefore, that traits inherited from grandmothers
become obsolete. Hence, under different regimes of
environmental fluctuation, the selective pressure on grand
mothering might be different as a result of different effects
on cultural transmission.
Conclusion
Our theoretical analysis suggests that when interactions
occur between individuals in a panmictic population, the
number of cultural traits carried by an individual at an
evolutionary steady state varies only weakly with vari-
ation in the social transmission rate b and depends
mainly on the innovation rate, l, and obsolescence rate,
, of cultural traits [although introducing other features,
like critical social learning (Enquist et al., 2007), may
change this result]. By contrast, when interactions occur
between relatives, the number of cultural traits carried by
an individual is markedly affected by the social trans-
mission rate b, which determines the extent to which the
relatives of an actor may benefit from the latter produc-
ing novel traits. This interaction between transmission
and relatedness may be relevant for understanding the
evolution of communication, whose role in the evolution
of cumulative cultural dynamics remains to be further
investigated.
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Appendix
Steady-state number of cultural traits
The system of recurrence equations presented in the
main text for A•,t and O•,t (eqns 2 and 6) is linear and can
be solved analytically. At steady state, when t ﬁ ¥, A• ¼
A•,t ¼ A•,t)1 and O• ¼ O•,t ¼ O•,t)1 and from eqns 2 and
6, we find that
A ¼ lðplþ ð1  pÞ½bnðN  1Þl0p0lþ boð1  ÞOÞ

;
ð26Þ
where
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O ¼ ½1  lð1  pÞbnðN  1Þl0p0l
1  ½1  lð1  pÞboð1  Þ
: ð27Þ
In a monomorphic population l0 ¼ l• ¼ l and p0 ¼ p• ¼ p,
then eqns 26 and 27 reduce to eqns 9 and 10 of the main
text.
Low b approximation
Inserting eqn 8 and eqns 26 and 27 into ¶f ⁄ ¶l• and
holding producing constant give the gradient of selection
on learning as
@f
@l
¼ ðplþ ð1  pÞ½nsþboð1  ÞOÞð1  lÞ

þ lð1  pÞboð1  Þ½@O=@lð1  lÞ

 ð1 þ AÞ; ð28Þ
where A is given by eqn 9, and it can be seen from
eqn 27 that ¶O• ⁄ ¶l• £ 0. If bo ¼ bn ¼ b, a first-order
Taylor expansion of the selective pressure around b ¼ 0
gives
@f
@l
¼fplþð1pÞ½nsþbð1ÞðN1Þlpl=gð1 lÞ

 1þ lfplþð1pÞ½nsþbð1ÞðN1Þlpl=g

 
þOðb2Þ; ð29Þ
where we used O¼ ½ðN  1Þlpl=þOðbÞ and @O=ð@lÞ ¼
OðbÞ.
Inserting eqn 8 and eqns 26 and 27 into ¶f ⁄ ¶p• and
holding learning constant give the gradient of selection
on producing as
@f
@p
¼ lð1 lÞ

l nsþboð1ÞO½ þð1pÞboð1Þ
@O
@p
 
;
ð30Þ
and it can be seen from eqn 27 that ¶O• ⁄ ¶p• ‡ 0. When
bo ¼ bn ¼ b, a first-order Taylor expansion of eqn 30
around b ¼ 0 gives
@f
@p
¼ ð1  lÞll

1  bðN  1Þlp

 
þ Oðb2Þ: ð31Þ
Setting the partial derivatives in eqns 29 and 31 to
zero, neglecting terms Oðb2Þ, and solving for l and p give
p ¼  ⁄ [lb(N ) 1)] and l ¼ (l ) ) ⁄ (2l).
If bo ¼ bn ¼ b, a first-order Taylor expansion of eqn 9
around b ¼ 0 gives
A ¼ lpl

1 þ bðN  1Þlð1  pÞ

 
þ Oðb2Þ: ð32Þ
Neglecting Oðb2Þ and inserting p ¼  ⁄ [lb(N ) 1)] and l ¼
(l ) ) ⁄ (2l) into this equation produce A ¼ (l ) ) ⁄ (2),
which is eqn 20 of the main text.
ESS learning and producing with relatives
Solving ¶f ⁄ ¶l• + j¶f ⁄ ¶l0 ¼ 0 (with eqns 13 and 22) and
¶f ⁄ ¶p• + j¶f ⁄ ¶p0 ¼ 0 (with eqns 15 and 23) for l and p
gives the candidate ES value of producing
p ¼ 1
1 þ j jþ
1
lbnðN  1Þ
 
; ð33Þ
where the ES candidate level of learning is given by a
somewhat complicated formula:
l ¼fjðjþ1Þ½ðN1Þb12g
ﬃﬃﬃ
l
p
2ðN1Þjðjþ2Þb ﬃﬃﬃlp
þ
ðjþ1Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðj½ðN1Þb1þ2Þ2l4ðN1Þjðjþ2Þb
q
2ðN1Þjðjþ2Þb ﬃﬃﬃlp :
ð34Þ
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